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S ince countries across Latin America began to transition to civilian rule in the 1970s and 1980s, their armed forces have largely returned to the barracks to focus on 
security work. For Ecuador and Peru, this has meant focusing 
on security challenges in particularly unstable regions. In 
Ecuador, the army is concentrated in the north, where social 
confl ict surrounding the country’s oil industry is combined 
with destabilizing infl uences spilling over the border from 
Colombia. In Peru, remnants of the Shining Path insurgency 
remain active in the central and southern highlands, areas 
critical to the country’s oil, natural gas and mining sectors. 
While national security challenges have led the two armies 
to focus most intensively on these specifi c regions, private-
sector infl uence most effectively explains who benefi ts from 
their work in those zones. In effect, extractive industries have 
essentially hired the armies and have benefi ted from army 
services far more than the “public.”  
Ecuador
 Ecuador’s northern and northeastern provinces have 
faced two main security challenges since the country’s 
1979 transition to democracy. First, protesters demanding 
restitution from oil companies for land use and 
environmental damage have interrupted oil production 
in the northeast, jeopardizing the extraction of a resource 
that constitutes approximately 40 percent of Ecuador’s total 
exports. Second, the northernmost provinces of Esmeraldas 
(western coastal), Carchi (highlands) and Sucumbíos 
(eastern jungle), have experienced general insecurity linked 
to neighboring Colombia’s internal confl ict, with problems 
ranging from extortion and homicide to drug and arms 
traffi cking. This insecurity has intensifi ed since 2000, 
when the U.S. and Colombia implemented Plan Colombia, 
a major offensive against insurgents that has pushed the 
confl ict south. These twin challenges have caused the 
Ecuadorian army to focus on the north, with its offi cial 
priorities including defending the border from incursions by 
armed Colombian insurgents, fi ghting crime and protecting 
strategic areas, including oil interests.  
 At the national level, two clients offer resources to the 
army in return for security services: the U.S. Southern 
Command and oil companies. Agreements made at this 
highest level commit the army to missions and thereby 
“frame” more specifi c negotiations at the local level. The 
Southern Command provides support for the army’s 
antinarcotics and border defense efforts in the north. 
In negotiations with the local Southern Command 
representatives, known as the MilGroup, Ecuadorian army 
leaders have welcomed U.S. resources, even though they 
commit the army to antinarcotics, a mission disliked by 
offi cers for having the potential to corrupt the military.  
 In the oil sector, until recently, written contracts 
between companies and the defense minister established 
in broad terms their respective commitments: 
security for companies in exchange for support for the 
military, including fuel, communications equipment, 
transportation, health care and room and board. The 
largest known contract was a 2001 five-year contract 
signed by the defense minister, the head of the state oil 
company Petroecuador and 15 private oil companies. 
Within this structure, each company also signed similarly 
broad contracts with army division commanders. 
 In 2007, the government made three main changes 
to the national-level contracting process in an attempt to 
halt direct contracting between the private sector and the 
military. First, the new organic defense law prohibited the 
armed forces from performing private services. Second, 
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providing a loophole around that law, Executive Decree 433 
defi ned protecting the oil industry as a national security 
interest and explicitly assigned the army to provide security 
for both public and private oil interests. Third, in this new 
context, Petroecuador now pays $10 million annually to 
support the military’s security work for the country’s oil 
interests — both public and private — according to a four-
year contract. 
 While decisions made at the highest levels commit 
northern army commanders to a certain amount of 
antinarcotics and oil security work — based on defi nitions 
of national security interests and contracts with the oil 
sector — it is at the local level where brigade and battalion 
commanders generally decide troop commitments and 
the resources required for each assignment. It is at this 
level that the most meaningful negotiations between army 
representatives and their clients take place. Therefore, a 
commander’s entrepreneurship, relationships with clients 
and bargaining skills all affect the amount of funds 
secured. These local-level deals continue to take place, in 
spite of the above-mentioned organic law, which outlaws 
such resource exchanges.
 Because oil companies pay the most, they benefi t 
the most from the army’s services. Specifi cally, the army 
is commissioned to patrol infrastructure, guard wells, 
confront protesters and participate in negotiations 
between communities and companies. Local deals between 
army commanders and oil companies have been ongoing 
throughout the post-transition period. The army’s loyalty 
to the private oil sector was apparent in my interviews 
with offi cers, who frequently described working for oil 
companies as being much more comfortable than their 
other assignments. The depth of the army’s focus on the 
oil sector is most evident, however, in the numbers. 
 Both news reports and interview responses document 
substantial commitment of resources to oil security. The 
army’s Fourth Division, the division most responsible for 
oil security in the northeast, has committed approximately 
25 percent of its forces to permanent oil security. In 
practice, additional army units — from the Fourth 
Division and from the army’s special forces brigade in the 
highlands — regularly put aside other assignments in order 
to address oil “emergencies.” Even in Sucumbíos, which 
borders Colombia’s war-ridden province of Putumayo 
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and therefore faces particularly intense insecurity on all 
fronts, private oil security takes priority. For instance, 
the special forces battalion “Rayo 24” — known to be the 
most operative unit in the north — has two detachments 
devoted entirely to oil security, both of which are based 
away from the border. Additionally, the remainder of the 
battalion has regularly provided added support to the oil 
sector from the unit’s central base.
 MilGroup also has infl uence over northern army 
units, but its power pales in comparison to that of private 
oil. In the post-2000 period, MilGroup began channeling 
resources to the north through direct relations with army 
commanders there. In response, not only have northern 
units embraced antinarcotics work, but local commanders 
have also regularly approached MilGroup offi cials to 
request more resources. Yet MilGroup loses out to oil 
companies in its open competition for army services. 
For example, in late 2007 during massive oil protests in 
Dayuma, Orellana — south of Sucumbíos — MilGroup 
provided supplies to a local school in an unsuccessful effort 
to help satisfy local needs and quell protests. MilGroup’s 
goal was to enable the army to conclude its oil security 
work and turn to U.S. priorities: antinarcotics and border 
defense efforts further north. 
 Two additional local clients are landowners and 
government officials. In Carchi and Esmeraldas, wealthy 
landowners — common targets of crop and livestock theft, 
extortion and kidnapping — provide fuel, tires and room 
and board for army patrols. (This security is in no way 
“public”; patrols do not serve the nearby impoverished 
communities.) Resources from landowners constitute 
critical support for the army battalion in Carchi, which 
is void of oil or associated infrastructure. In contrast, 
access to security services is more limited for owners of 
palm oil plantations in coastal Esmeraldas. They must 
compete with the local battalion’s main client, private 
oil, which provides the army with resources in exchange 
for security for the privately owned Oleoducto de Crudos 
Pesados, a pipeline that transports heavy crude from the 
Amazon to the Pacific. 
 Local government officials constitute a final group 
of clients. They reimburse battalions for anticrime 
work — especially urban patrols — with fuel subsidies, 
equipment and payment of labor costs for on-base 
construction projects.
Peru
 Peru has also undergone a privatization of the army’s 
security services. There, the focus is on counterinsurgency 
efforts to eliminate the remnants of The Shining Path, 
a guerilla organization that shook the countryside in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The organization is now active 
only in small regions of the country, including the Upper 
Huallaga Valley and the southern highland region of the 
Valley of the Ene and Apurimac Rivers (known by its 
Spanish acronym, VRAE), the latter being the insurgency’s 
center of military training and activity. In this context, 
Peru’s government has ordered the army to focus on 
eliminating the insurgency above all other missions. 
The reality on the ground, however, is that the army’s 
counterinsurgency efforts in the VRAE are largely for sale 
to private companies in the mining and hydrocarbons 
sectors; the army patrols the areas of the valley that are 
critical for industry in return for logistical support.  
 The case of Peru’s natural gas consortium, Camisea, 
demonstrates this dynamic, as its gas line crosses through 
the VRAE. As of late 2005, the army had units near each 
of the 14 Camisea installations that ran along the largely 
underground pipeline, a number equal to approximately 
half of all army counterinsurgency bases operating 
in the VRAE at the time. Peru’s army has conducted 
counterinsurgency patrols near Camisea installations in 
return for resources, according to agreements between the 
“Los Cabitos” brigade in Ayacucho and Transportadora 
de Gas del Perú (Gas Transporter of Peru, TGP), the 
Peru, showing the Upper Huallaga Valley (top yellow), the VRAE 
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consortium Camisea formed to build and operate its 
natural gas pipelines. As of 2005, all of Los Cabitos’ 
counterinsurgency bases — numbering more than 10 — 
were lined up along the pipeline. TGP built and supplied 
these bases and covered all food and fuel costs. As a private 
security offi cial explained, “Offi cially, Los Cabitos… have 
their strategic plans that determine where their bases are 
and what patrols they do, but somehow, coincidentally, 
their bases end up by Camisea, and their patrols are there 
as well.” 
 As of early 2009, Peru’s army also contracted its 
services to Techint, the private Argentine company that is 
a leading member of the TGP consortium. The two army 
bases nearest to Techint’s Block 57 construction project in 
La Mar, Ayacucho, conducted regular patrols around the 
project, and in return, Techint’s station supplied the bases. 
The army plans to add another base in La Mar, and Techint 
is seeking security from that new base, too. 
 In sum, extractive industries have privatized the 
Peruvian and Ecuadorian armies by buying the armies’ 
services and reaping disproportionate benefi ts relative to 
the public. Strategic decision making at the national level 
certainly infl uences the overall mission and the amount of 
military presence in different regions of the two countries. 
Nonetheless, on a day-to-day basis, local commanders 
allocate troops not according to technical decisions 
regarding national security interests but rather according 
to who can and will reimburse the army for its services. 
Private actors in the natural resource sectors pay — and 
benefi t — the most. This dynamic is true both where the 
army’s main mission is counterinsurgency, as in Peru, and 
where the army is assigned to multiple missions, ranging 
from border defense to protest control, as in Ecuador.  
Maiah Jaskoski is an assistant professor in the Department of 
National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School 
and a visiting scholar at CLAS. This article is based on her 
fi eldwork conducted in Peru and Ecuador during 2005, 
2006 and early 2009. The views expressed here are hers 
and do not represent the positions of the Navy, Defense 
Department or U.S. government. She spoke for CLAS on 
April 27, 2009.
Peruvian soldiers guard the Argentine natural gas concession Techint.
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